A paper by Andrea Prat (joint with Amil Dasgupta) Information aggregation in financial markets with career concerns, is forthcoming in the Journal of Economic Theory.
Abstract: What are the equilibrium features of a dynamic financial market in which traders care about their reputation for ability? The authors modify a standard sequential trading model to include traders with career concerns. They show that this market cannot be informationally efficient: there is no equilibrium in which prices converge to the true value, even after an infinite sequence of trades. They characterize the most revealing equilibrium of this game and show that an increase in the strength of the traders’ reputational concerns has a negative effect on the extent of information that can be revealed in equilibrium but a positive effect on market liquidity.
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